When Experience Fails

It's Sunday morning here in Abingdon, and after a night of grinding teeth and muttering curse words in my sleep, I awoke to find the film of the Duke game sitting in my inbox. The loss was not just critical in the current chase for the Coastal Division title, but is perhaps even more damaging to program perception. Even though Duke is a vastly improved football team, nationally they are regarded as a traditionally weak program. The Hokies giftwrapped the game on a silver platter even though Duke gave them every opportunity to, not only win the football game, but win in a comfortable, albeit not pretty fashion, similar to wins over Georgia Tech, Pitt, and UNC. It was a perfect cauldron of injuries, bye week rust, distractions, suspensions, bad decisions, bounces, fundamental breakdowns, and an opponent that fought like hell.

Watching the film, I was overwhelmed by numerous breakdowns by players who have produced critical plays all season, and at the same time I was left scratching my head at some of the game planning and decisions. Throughout the bye week, we heard that the running game would be cleaned up, and that players on both sides of the ball had an opportunity to heal for the stretch run. Instead, the offensive playcalling often seemed to play right into the strength of the Duke defense, and some defense senior leaders delivered quiet performances. Even when the Hokies dialed up the perfect call, things seemed to go Duke's way. Accordingly, this week's film review will require two parts. The next installment will feature the offensive game plan and coaching, and I want the extra time to really take a good look at the read option game and understand the diminishing returns. As for today, I want to focus on the breakdowns by some of those experienced players. I pride myself on trying not being overly critical of players, and instead trying to focus on technique and the application to the success and failure of the plays. I want every player in the Virginia Tech uniform to succeed, and nobody is happier than me when one of the players who I have been critical of comes back to make a huge play. I will gladly eat that humble pie.

Often this season, I have discussed how a lack of experience has caused Virginia Tech to play close games, and not put away opponents. The loss to Duke represents not the result of a lack of experience, but a failure to make the plays you expect by talented experienced players. The letdown started before the game as 5th year senior J.R. Collins, whose story of redemption and terrific play was one of the best narratives of the early part of the season, managed to get himself suspended. That further hurt a defense already weakened by the loss of Kyle Fuller and Brandon Facyson. Foster's defensive line rotation became scrambled and forced Charlie Wiles to utilize an inexperienced Ken Ekanem (who was sucked inside on the Anthony Boone touchdown run). Once the game was underway, experienced players made mistakes on fundamentals that have been reinforced since Pee Wee football. It was difficult to watch.

D.J. Coles Non-Touchdown

Receivers who motion are taught that they must come to a complete stop or can't be moving towards the line of scrimmage. Again, this is taught by coaches and enforced by officials from the time Pee Wee teams start to utilize motion as part of the offense. Receivers can be moving as long as no other receiver is in motion and the motion man is moving backwards or laterally. Any movement towards the line of scrimmage without resetting is by rule a penalty.

The proliferation of the spread and the associated concepts of multiple motions include rocket motion and jet-motion have pushed the boundaries of those rules. Numerous teams feature techniques where backs and receivers appear to be moving towards the line of scrimmage before the snap, and often teams feature skill position players "bouncing" up and down in anticipation. By rule, this should be a motion penalty, but most officials use their discretion to overlook the widespread practice. I have often noted that the Hokies and their opponents have gotten away with numerous motion penalties at critical moments.

The non-touchdown pass to Coles is another example of a beautiful play call that works perfectly against Duke's set. Thomas motions Coles across. Coles starts as if the play is a flood pattern with him going to the back pylon, and Willie Byrn goes to the front pylon, but then Coles plants his outside like and slants back inside. Not only is Coles wide open, but Byrn is wide open at the front pylon.

00:08:06–00:08:13

Sadly, Coles clearly did not stop his motion and get set (required if he turns to face the line) and he was moving towards the line of scrimmage at the snap. This may be the easiest procedure penalty a Ron Cherry crew ever called, and it really did not give Coles any kind of advantage. Even if Coles does get set, based on the reaction of the Duke defense either he or Byrn would have scored anyway. Nobody has been a stronger advocate of D.J. Coles than me, and the Hokies need his ability to make tough catches in the red zone, but sloppy alignment and pre-snap motion is the kind of mistake that Aaron Moorehead was crushing freshman Carlis Parker for in preseason and is unexpected of a veteran.

Thomas Does Too Much

On the next play, Logan Thomas made his most egregious error of the game. While most post game complaints about Thomas focused on accuracy, it was his game management that cost the Hokies most dearly. Following the Coles' penalty, Thomas threw an interception that defies explanation.

Let's review the situation. It's late in the 2nd quarter. The Hokies have dominated time of possession, but have failed to score and trail 0-3. The Virginia Tech defense has forced several Blue Devil turnovers. The Hokies are facing a long 3rd-and-goal following a penalty that has taken a touchdown off the board. The Hokies need to come away with points on this drive. This is a situation where an experienced quarterback needs to understand the game scenario. Late in the game, trailing and needing a touchdown to tie or win with limited additional opportunities for possession, the quarterback must be a playmaker and take a risk. However, in the 2nd quarter in a low scoring game with the defense playing well and the wind creating some havoc, he has to respect the possession and protect the football.

Loeffler doesn't help Thomas either. He follows up his brilliant original 3rd down call with a rather strange one. On the left side, Trey Edmunds runs a curl and Stanford runs a corner route from the slot, which is a combination known as a smash route. On the right, Cline runs a curl then goes vertical. This is designed to pull a zone defender out of the middle so Willie Byrn can fake going to the flat and then cut back inside on a crossing route. D.J. Coles runs to the back pylon.

Loeffler guesses that Duke will play zone, but the Blue Devils play man and nothing is open. Thomas seems to initially look at either Coles or Byrn, and comes back to the smash route where Duke has three defenders covering Edmunds and Stanford. The Hokie receivers go into scramble drill mode, with Byrn breaking open for a brief second off of Cline's double move. Thomas is still looking left and starting to run away from his throwing strength and doesn't see Byrn.

00:08:23–00:08:33

Now it's decision time for Thomas. He likely isn't quick enough to run for the touchdown as the Duke end has a good pursuit angle. Edmunds runs away from Thomas' throwing strength, and both Byrn and Cline (who is now crossing the back of the end zone) are out of Thomas' line of vision. Even worse, Edmunds, Byrn, and Cline are all running at each other, which is creating a traffic jam of receivers. There is only one throw available to Thomas where he can throw into the path where he is running, and that is Josh Stanford, but Stanford isn't coming back to Thomas, making such a throw risky. If Stanford comes back to Thomas, he should be open at the front pylon.

Given the lack of options and the game situation, Thomas should throw the ball into the stands or take the sack. Instead, he throws perhaps the most high risk ball possible, against his running direction to a receiver running away from his motion (Edmunds). Duke has several defenders in the area, and makes an easy interception. Duke then goes down and kicks what ends up being the field goal that results in the difference in the game.

Risk Averse

I have defended Thomas to the hilt, but that play was inexcusable, and from then on Thomas seemed to be risk averse. He threw additional interceptions, but both came on deflected balls where his receivers should have made the catch. But, time and again, Thomas either threw to his check down receivers and overlooked wide open receivers down field. Even after he should've restored some of his confidence on the long touchdown drive that began with the bomb to Knowles, Thomas seemed to be dazed and indecisive. On the final interception, Willie Byrn was wide open on a post route and it seemed as if Thomas looked right at him, but he didn't pull the trigger. Instead he froze, and came back to Knowles, who was in heavy traffic on his crossing route. Knowles, as he did early in the season, made a hesitant effort to catch the ball in traffic, and Duke caught the deflected ball for the game clinching interception.

Another play stood out in my mind. In the 3rd quarter, Thomas made a short throw to Demitri Knowles on a crossing route, and that ended up garnering around 7 yards. Something bothered me on the play. I noted the time, and went back to look when Billdozer completed the film package. My jaw dropped when I watched the play again.

00:14:40–00:14:47

Loeffler has called a combination route, with Knowles as a wider slot running a delay crossing route while Cline runs off the safety with a post. Thomas should read the middle linebacker, who jumps Knowles on the crossing route. The safety, who should have Cline on the post route, spies Joel Caleb running a short crossing route from his left split end spot, and takes a step forward. Take a look at Cline on the post.

My goodness, I am not sure how much more open you can be. I counted at least three plays where Thomas had receivers wide open on deep posts, including the final interception, and not a single time did Logan air it out.

4th-and-1

The defense isn't immune to scrutiny either. Let's examine the 4th-and-1 play that sent me into a Twitter tizzy on Saturday. Duke brought in Brandon Connette, and Bud Foster countered with a 46 defensive alignment, featuring Kyshoen Jarrett at an inside linebacker position, Chuck Clark as a whip outside linebacker, and Tariq Edwards as an outside linebacker on the opposite side of the whip. Foster guessed correctly that Duke would run the straight power lead instead of the inverted veer, and called a stunt that freed Jarrett up to make the play unblocked right where the QB wanted to go.

On a game where seemingly every critical bounce went against the Hokies, Bud Foster dialed up the perfect play call on the game's final critical play.

00:20:35–00:20:39

Both defensive tackles attack the inside shoulder of the guards to establish a gap fit. They need to maintain a wall in the center. Both ends Dadi Nicolas and James Gayle stunt through the inside gaps with the intent of drawing each tackle to block down. Tariq Edwards and Chuck Clark have contain responsibility on the edge. The critical stunt combination belongs to Gayle and Jarrett. Gayle's stunt to the inside should either suck that tackle inside, freeing up Jarrett to burst through the seam created on the outside shoulder of the tackle, or on a lead it will cross up the tackle and the tailback who is serving as the lead blocker.

The defense works so well, it actually may have worked too well. The tailback leads inside to where Jarrett would be if the defense played straight ahead gap control, and the tackle goes to the inside with Gayle. With both blockers going inside, Jarrett is unblocked coming through the outside tackle gap in perfect position to make the tackle. Nicolas beats the left tackle cleanly to the inside and gets contact on Connette, which seemed to throw Jarrett off. Jarrett dove at Connette, who was off balance and was essentially a sitting duck.

At this point, Jarrett and Gayle, two experienced and talented players who have had excellent seasons, had a breakdown in their fundamentals. Jarrett should stay on his feet and deliver a form tackle into the already stumbling Connette. Ninety-nine times out of one-hundred, he makes that tackle for a two-yard loss. This time, he gets overeager to make the play, and Connette keeps on his feet.

Gayle executed the initial stunt magnificently, but the final component to the play is his gap fit. In the scheme, if Jarrett can't make that tackle, he is still creating outside leverage to force Connette into Gayle. Once he draws that tackle inside, he can not continue to be driven further inside, or he widens the space that Jarrett has to fill. Gayle has a breakdown in his fundamentals, standing almost straight up on the play as he forms up for his gap fit. Linemen are taught low pad level since Pee Wee football, and low man wins is a fundamental that cannot be forsaken. Duke senior right tackle Perry Simmons, a three year starter who played an excellent football game, was initially beaten inside by Gayle but kept his legs moving. As Gayle got high, Simmons had both hands firmly under Gayle's left armpit, and his head in front of Gayle's chest in perfect blocking position. Simmons was lower than Gayle and kept his leg drive, and drove Gayle an additional yard inside before Gayle was able to cross his face and get back in the play.

Again, let's look at the defensive design and Connette's lack of balance. If Gayle can hold his gap fit, Connette would have stumbled right into him, or at the very least Jack Tyler, who was playing a spy and following the ball, may have been able to scrape across and make a play. But when Gayle was pushed back, he also shielded Tyler inside.

Gayle is a terrific player, and he has made two critical game saving plays already this season (the forced safety versus East Carolina and the sack versus Marshall). Because of flawless execution in the past, I'm accustomed to both Gayle and Jarrett making that play.

Still, even with these breakdowns, it was clear that the Hokies should have won the football game. Later this week I'll take a look at the offensive gameplan and play calling to determine how both impacted the offense's inability to sustain drives.